The Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) said in Advisory Update 113, issued with a data cut-off of 12 November 2026, that the threat level in the Strait of Hormuz remains “severe.” The advisory cited reported attacks on tankers on 10 and 11 November, identified as UKMTO reports 201-26 and 202-26, and stated that further attacks on transiting commercial vessels were considered highly likely, particularly off Musandam, Oman.
JMIC also assessed the Arabian Gulf threat as “substantial.” Its update said that ten attacks inside the Gulf had occurred since 7 October and highlighted continuing navigational-system interference, broader military activity, and risks around anchorages and ship-to-ship transfer areas. It noted that vessels stationary for extended periods, or maintaining AIS transmission while static, could face elevated targeting risk. These are threat assessments, not evidence that every vessel in the area will be targeted.
The advisory reported no new specific UKMTO, MARAD, NAVCENT or NAVAREA IX notices on GNSS or electronic interference between 8 and 12 November. However, it said baseline advisories remained in force. JMIC further referred to MARAD Advisory 2026-013, which advises US-flag commercial vessels to disregard Houthi instructions to activate AIS or provide voyage information and to report such contacts.
The material development is therefore not a newly announced routing closure or a formal prohibition on transit. It is a renewed official risk assessment following two reported tanker attacks in successive days, against a background of continuing regional incidents. The JMIC document does not establish responsibility for the reported attacks, vessel damage, injuries, cargo losses, insurance outcomes, or changes in flag-state or port-state requirements.
Why this matters: for owners, charterers, masters, P&I interests and cargo stakeholders, the update increases the importance of checking whether security plans, charterparty risk allocations, war-risk cover terms, crew welfare arrangements, communications protocols and delay contingencies remain aligned with the actual voyage. This is analysis, not operational or navigational advice. A JMIC regional assessment cannot substitute for flag-state instructions, insurer requirements, company procedures, intelligence subscriptions, port advice, or a master’s real-time navigational judgment.
Evidence remains limited in the public material reviewed. JMIC’s assessment is an authoritative industry-security coordination source, but the specific incident details were not independently verified in the consulted material. Stakeholders should treat the reported attacks and forward-looking threat language as security reporting and assessment rather than as adjudicated findings.
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