On 6 November 2026, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) said its Council had renewed its call for vital shipping lanes to remain open, safe and secure, while emphasizing protection of seafarers affected by geopolitical conflicts. The statement followed the Council’s 138th session in London, held from 2 to 6 November. ([imo.org](https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/pressbriefings/pages/imo-council-c138-urges-stronger-protection-of-seafarers-amid-threats-to-global-shipping-.aspx?utm_source=openai))
According to the IMO, the Council condemned attacks attributed to the Houthis against merchant and commercial ships and crews in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait. It also condemned attacks attributed to the Russian Federation against merchant vessels, seafarers, port infrastructure and maritime safety services linked to Ukraine’s special maritime corridor. The IMO reported that the Council mourned the 25th seafarer death since the onset of the Strait of Hormuz conflict. These are statements and figures attributed to the Organization’s official Council briefing; this review did not independently verify individual incidents or the casualty total. ([imo.org](https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/pressbriefings/pages/imo-council-c138-urges-stronger-protection-of-seafarers-amid-threats-to-global-shipping-.aspx?utm_source=openai))
Verified regulatory position: the Council communication is a policy and diplomatic statement, not a newly published amendment to SOLAS, MARPOL, the ISPS Code or another convention imposing a new direct compliance duty on shipowners, charterers or masters. The IMO’s published forward programme separately identifies further work on ship-emissions measures later in November and December, rather than a newly adopted security rule from Council 138. ([imo.org](https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/meetingsummaries/pages/iswg-ghg-22.aspx?utm_source=openai))
**Why this matters:** The immediate operational consequence is not a change in statutory navigation requirements. Rather, the Council’s intervention is a current high-level signal that conflict-related risks to crews, vessels and shore-side maritime infrastructure remain material in key trade corridors. This is analysis, not an IMO instruction. Operators and chartering, cargo, insurance and P&I interests may therefore need to continue assessing voyage-specific security information, contractual risk allocation, crew welfare arrangements, communication protocols, port-call exposure and sanctions-screening implications through their own approved processes.
The Council’s wording should not be read as an operational clearance, a route recommendation, or confirmation that a particular waterway is safe. Conditions may differ between transits and may change quickly. Masters and companies remain responsible for applying their safety-management systems, flag-state and port-state requirements, insurer or security-provider advice, and any applicable government restrictions.
For Brazilian cargo interests, the relevance is principally indirect: disruption or heightened risk in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, Black Sea or Hormuz-linked trading environment can affect routing, voyage duration, freight exposure, war-risk terms and cargo-delivery reliability even where a Brazil-related leg is not physically transiting those areas. This is an operational inference, not a confirmed market outcome.
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